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CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND APPROPRIATION
MECHANISMS
Sean M. O’Connor*

INTRODUCTION
Now that Congress’s House Judiciary Committee has undertaken a review of current copyright law,1 and the Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, has called for the “Next Great Copyright Act,”2 sides are being drawn
by various interest groups. Perhaps following the pitting of information
technology firms against bio-chem and pharma firms in the patent reform
battles leading to the America Invents Act,3 some interest groups want to
divide the copyright reform debates into “innovators” and “creators.” Much
of this seems driven by large tech firms such as Google, along with advocacy groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) who are
aligned with them, as they push for copyright reform. The narrative being
developed is that tech firms are simply trying to create the innovative technologies and digital platforms of the future, while being dragged down by
behemoth content owners who are trying to thwart this progress to maintain
the status quo of an analog content world that no longer exists.4
* Boeing International Professor and Assistant Dean for Law, Business, and Technology Initiatives, University of Washington School of Law (Seattle); Senior Scholar, Center for the Protection of
Intellectual Property (CPIP), George Mason University School of Law. The Author would like to thank
Adam Mossoff, Mark Schultz, and Matt Barblan at CPIP, and Jessica Gallinaro, Jake McMurdo, and
other staff at the George Mason Law Review. All errors are the Author’s own.
1 Press Release, House Judiciary Committee, Chairman Goodlatte Announces Comprehensive
Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=1B5C521A-D006-B517-9949-43E692E1E52E.
2 Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 315 (2013); The
Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law, Statement Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Maria
A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director, U.S. Copyright Office), available at
http://copyright.gov/regstat/2013/regstat03202013.html (last visited Ma. 2, 2015).
3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). While
patent reform had been considered by Congress for a number of years before passage of AIA, serious
disputes over proposed changes to patent injunctions and damages between the information technology
industry, on the one hand, and the bio-chem industries, on the other, had slowed down efforts to find an
acceptable compromise. See, e.g., Diane Bartz, U.S. Battle Over Patent Reform Headed for Compromise?, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/10/us-patents-idUSTRE
5295J920090310.
4 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ERA:
BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 1, 7-8 (Stephen A. Merrill & William J. Raduchel eds., 2013).
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But this simple narrative is quite misleading and harmful to the kind of
rational, objective debate necessary to accommodate the newest forms of
digital and social media in the copyright ecosystem. Great creators are innovators and great innovators are creators. The content companies, including large legacy movie and music studios, have developed impressive new
digital technologies. And digital technology and platform distribution firms
are increasingly creating new content. In the middle, industries such as video gaming have always existed at the crossroads of developing cutting edge
technology and content. What society is really witnessing is an explosion of
creative innovation across a range of fields.
But no matter what the field or form, creative innovation relies on
some mode of appropriation. Without it, anyone can copy or use the innovation without payment or attribution to the original producer. In such a
world, it seems likely that few will invest significant time or resources into
fully developing and implementing their ideas for a particular creative innovation. They will still have the ideas, and they may be willing to implement them in some inexpensive, fast manner. While that may work for
some kinds of creative innovation, it does not work for many others. Copyright is only one appropriation mechanism. There are many others, including the areas of intellectual property (“IP”) outside of copyright.
A problem that underlies the emerging innovator-creator copyright debates is that creative innovators naturally want their inputs to be “free” (in
both the cost and repurposing senses), while they need their outputs to be
appropriable if they want to receive a return on investment for their innovations. As argued below, this appears to have led some tech firms and their
advocates to engage in a diversionary sleight of hand in which they seek to
minimize the appropriation mechanisms of those providing their inputs,
while hiding or downplaying robust efforts to appropriate their outputs.5
This Essay explores the current state of this phenomenon, especially with
regard to digital and social media. It argues that policymakers need to focus
on this broader perspective and not allow some interested players to narrow
the debate to the appropriation mechanisms of only one stakeholder group
in creative innovation ecosystems.
I.

“CREATORS VS. INNOVATORS” IS A FALSE DICHOTOMY

What is a “creator” that is not also an “innovator,” and vice versa? It
may be tempting when observing current debates to adopt the apparent
popular sense that creators are “artists” who produce aesthetic “creative
expression,” while innovators are entrepreneurs who produce “technology.”

5

See infra Part III.
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As I have written elsewhere,6 this perspective also unfortunately maps onto
a gendered distinction between “feminine” aesthetic arts and “masculine”
math and science-based technology.7 This dubious distinction is so pervasive that it seems to underlie the common division of IP into “soft IP” for
the creative arts (e.g., copyright and trademark) and “hard IP” for industrial
technology (e.g., patents and trade secrets).8 But when one digs deeper into
what so-called creators and innovators actually do, the existing dichotomy—and seemingly tight correlation to “artists” and “entrepreneurs,” respectively—largely evaporates.
First, the distinction between innovative and replicative activities is
the key to thinking about what constitutes innovation. As Professor William
Baumol notes in the entrepreneurship management literature, “innovative
entrepreneurs” are those who “locate new ideas and . . . put them into effect.”9 By contrast, the replicative entrepreneur is one who can function in
the broader, earlier sense of “entrepreneur” as simply anyone who undertakes a new venture.10 The innovative entrepreneur commercializes new
kinds of goods or services, including new ways of producing or distributing
them.
In this light, one can see first and foremost that many artists and entrepreneurs are replicative. The artist who produces a nominally new creative
expression, but which fits closely within an existing genre and breaks no
new ground, is not innovative. However, the work may have other significant value, and thus this understanding is not meant to denigrate such
works. Equally so, many entrepreneurs are small business owners who have
opened a franchise of an existing chain of goods or service providers, or
who open a new restaurant or store within an established industry (e.g.,
pizzerias, dry cleaners). When there is nothing notably different about the
goods or services, or the way they are produced or distributed, then the
business is replicative and not innovative. Again, “replicative” need not be
pejorative. There can be great value in replicative businesses, especially
where they fill an unmet need in a neighborhood. However, this illustrates
why “entrepreneur” is not co-extensive with “innovator.”
In contrast to replicative entrepreneurship, innovative entrepreneurship
is that which provides new kinds of products or services, or ways of producing or distributing them. While Professor Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative
6 See SEAN M. O’CONNOR, METHOD+OLOGY AND THE MEANS OF INNOVATION (forthcoming
June 2016) (manuscript, ch. 4, at 1) (on file with the author).
7 See id. (manuscript, ch. 4, at 55).
8 Id. (manuscript, ch. 4, at 48).
9 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 18 (2010).
10 Id. In fact “entrepreneur” began its modern meaning when Richard Cantillon, the eigtheenth
century pioneer of entrepreneurship studies, imported it without translation as the French word for
“undertaker” (in the sense of anyone embarking on an undertaking) in his English language writings.
See RICHARD CANTILLON, ESSAI SUR LA NATURE DU COMMERCE EN GÉNÉRAL 388-89 (Henry Higgs
ed. & trans., Macmillan & Co. 1931) (1755).
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destruction”—the “disruptive innovation” that upends incumbents in an
existing business space11—is often held as the archetype of innovative entrepreneurship, it is not the only kind. Incremental innovation that results in
evolution within existing industries or businesses can also be quite valuable.
At the same time, there can be creative aesthetic works that establish
or modify genres, techniques, or modes of audience interaction. These
works should count as “innovation” even though the innovation literature is
largely focused on technology innovation. A new catchy tune firmly within
an existing genre such as country music is valuable, but it is not innovation.
However, a new song or sound that crosses over genres or creates a new
genre is innovative. For example, the seminal collaboration between composers Antonio Carlos Jobim and Vinícius de Moraes on “Girl from Ipanema,” as recorded by João Gilberto, his wife Astrud Gilberto, and Stan Getz,
arguably launched a new version of the Brazilian genre bossa nova that was
accessible to United States audiences in the 1960s.12 Similarly, bands like
Uncle Tupelo, and successors such as Wilco, created a sub- or crossover
genre called “alt-country” in the 1990s.13
Turning to what constitutes creativity, it has become clear that individuals from many walks of life exercise creativity in their activities. While
it is difficult to precisely define creativity, the general notion of it actually
seems to overlap with innovation.14 Creativity can be seen as individuals or
groups coming up with new artifacts or methods that draw on inspiration
from multiple sources.15 Sometimes linked to “divergent” thinking in which
a person synthesizes multiple seemingly unrelated ideas,16 creativity often
generates entirely new kinds of works. But creativity is not limited to this;
rather it can also be used to produce new iterations of works in an existing
field of activity. At the same time, a nominally new work that is largely
replicative of existing works in the same field, with perhaps trivial variations, would likely not be viewed as creative.
11

See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950)
(introducing “Creative Destruction” and explaining its effects on capitalist industries); CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO
FAIL, at xii-xiv (1997) (introducing “disruptive innovation” to describe the technological threat that
develops generally from within particular industries).
12 Stan Getz had already been releasing Latin-inspired jazz records including bossa nova and
samba tracks beginning in 1961, but it was the collaboration with Gilberto on “Getz/Gilberto” (featuring
“Girl from Ipanema”) that gave the new (to the U.S.) genre widespread fame and established it permanently here. See Suzel Ana Reily, Tom Jobin and the Bossa Nova Era, 15 POPULAR MUSIC 1, 1 (1996).
13 See Alternative Country, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_country (last
modified Nov. 26, 2014, 6:20 PM).
14 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 1999 (2011).
15 Id. at 2004-05; O’CONNOR, supra note 6 (manuscript, ch. 1, at 7).
16 See Mandel, supra note 14, at 2004-05.
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In this way, it should be clear that innovators are often creative, and
creators are often innovative. Both take inspiration from multiple sources—
this after all is a big part of “outside of the box” thinking—and synthesize it
into a new type of artifact or way of doing things. A more nuanced approach places creativity as a necessary part of innovation.17 Creativity and
innovation may sit along the same continuum with the former perhaps extending somewhat further down towards derivative works (in the artistic not
legal sense) than the latter, which requires new (sub)categories of artifacts
or methods.
In sum, “creator” is not co-extensive with “artist” just as “innovator”
is not co-extensive with “entrepreneur.” Artists are usually creators and in
many cases innovate within their field, developing entirely new genres or
techniques. Entrepreneurs are innovative when they fall within Baumol’s
subcategory of “innovative entrepreneurs,” and to innovate they generally
rely on their creative skills. Accordingly, the temptation to make synonyms
out of artist:creator and entrepreneur:innovator should be resisted. Further,
the alleged contrast between “creator” and “innovator” is not so stark, and
in fact may be counterproductive.
Instead of contrasting creativity and innovation, U.S. copyright and
patent law history reveal that the phrase “genius and skill” traditionally
characterized both. In nineteenth century cases, judges used this phrase to
describe what both authors and inventors did.18 But this was not some idle
conjunction of terms that sounded well together or overlapped. Instead,
“genius” was quite distinct from “skill.” Most important, “genius” did not
encompass the modern popular sense of high intelligence. Rather, it was the
older sense of pure inspiration with origins in the “divine madness” mentioned by Plato and the Ancient Greeks.19 Derived from the same linguistic
root that led to “genie,” “genius” was secularized in the Renaissance to
remove the troubling supernatural—especially demonic—elements.20
Stripped of this baggage, this mysterious inspiration that could come to
anyone, whether they had experience and skills in a particular field or not,
became a major desideratum in the Renaissance and early modern period in
Europe.21
But the fine arts was not the only area that prized “genius.” If anything, it was even more prized amongst the emerging class of engineers
designing impressive new machines and methods for construction and war17

Id. at 1999. This would mean that by definition innovators are always creative, while creators
might not always be innovative.
18 See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 187 (1853) (Nelson, J., dissenting), rev’d
in part, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 132 (1860).
19 See Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art” of the Patent System, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2015) (manuscript at 5-6) (on file with the author).
20 Id. (manuscript at 14-15).
21 Id. (manuscript at 15-16).

978

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 22:4

fare in the early modern period. While Leonardo da Vinci is perhaps the
most famous of these, there were a number of such inventive engineers
offering their services to princes across Europe from the fourteenth century
onward.22 In fact, the term “engineer” derived from “ingenere” and was
related to “ingenious,” circling back again to the shared roots of “genie”
and “genius.”23 This underscored the importance of “genius” inspiration for
these new “engineers.”
At the same time, equally prized in both artisans and engineers was the
“skill” they had developed in producing artifacts or results in the real world.
Much of this was in the form of the “show-how” variant of know-how that
had to be mastered through practice.24 Show-how cannot be codified into
text or images, although these mediums can be used to describe or help
convey some of the actions involved. In modern cognitive science, showhow is called “procedural knowledge” and is exemplified by learning to
ride a bicycle or play guitar.25 Because artisanal show-how was also frequently kept as trade secrets and demonstrated only to apprentices,26 its
dissemination could be quite limited. Regions that did not possess showhow actively sought it out, often through an early version of patents today
referred to as “patents of importation.”27
Innovation occurs when genius and skill come together and an unanticipated new kind of artifact or method is developed. The idea of this new
kind of thing arises through the inspirational sense of “genius,” but cannot
be realized without the artisan’s show-how craft skill. The challenge is that
not all inspired geniuses can master the requisite skill to bring their ideas to
practical application, while many skilled artisans may have little inspiration. Thus, those who possessed both were highly valued individuals.28 This
carried through to the emerging class of engineers in the early modern period in which the number of inspired geniuses amongst those with technical
skill was probably smaller than the number of geniuses in the creative artist
classes.29
22

See id. (manuscript at 14-16).
Id. (manuscript at 14-15).
24 Id. (manuscript at 12-13).
25 See JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE ARCHITECTURE OF COGNITION, at viii, 215 (1983); see also
ANNETTE KARMILOFF-SMITH, BEYOND MODULARITY: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 16-17 (1992) (discussing playing the piano and solving the Rubik’s Cube as examples of procedural knowledge). Procedural knowledge is contrasted with “declarative knowledge” that is
typified by declarative statements whose meanings are conveyed immediately upon comprehension by
the recipient. For example, “Tom is ten years old” does not have to be practiced or mastered.
26 See O’Connor, supra note 19 (manuscript at 13).
27 Id. (manuscript at 2); cf. Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1268-69
(2012).
28 See O’Connor, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15).
29 See id. (manuscript at 15-16).
23
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Beyond the core point that neither artist:creator nor entrepreneur:innovator are co-extensive, artists still sometimes become entrepreneurs and vice versa, further blurring the categories. This is not a new phenomenon. Samuel F.B. Morse was a visual artist who became fascinated
with uses of the newly harnessed “galvanic” force and then developed an
audiovisual system for communicating language at a distance through it,
resulting in the telegraph.30 In the current era, this transition of artist to entrepreneur seems to have increased especially with regard to digital and
social media start-ups.31 In a different vein are the actors, musicians, and
other artists who build off their fame to launch entrepreneurial products or
services.32 In the reverse, a number of entrepreneurs have become artists or
focused on art-based products or services. One set of examples comes from
the early decades of the music recording business in which entrepreneurs
who sought to profit from selling records, such as the Chess brothers at
Chess Records33 and Jim Stewart and Estelle Axton at Stax Records,34 discovered major talents and helped develop new genres such as rock and roll,
soul, and R&B.
Increasingly there are “convergence” firms and fields that generate
both creative content and innovative technology. Getty Images, for example, not only developed an innovative technology platform for digitizing
and distributing images, but it also now works directly with content creators
to produce new works for Getty Image’s catalogues.35 Likewise, Netflix,
which started as an Internet-based videos-by-mail service, moved into not
only online streaming distribution, but also into the content production
business with award-winning original programming including House of
Cards and Orange Is the New Black.36 Both Getty and Netflix converged
towards content production. But video game companies such as Valve
30

O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 68-69 (1854).
For example, the founders of Kickstarter are artists. Pressroom, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/press (last visited Mar, 2, 2015).
32 Artist-celebrities such as Jennifer Lopez and Sean “P-Diddy” Combs have parlayed success as
performers into multiple entrepreneurial product lines. Martin Bashir, Diddy Brings Same Old Hustle to
Host of New Pursuits, ABC NEWS (June 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/diddy-exclusivenightline-interview/story?id=10866530; JENNIFER LOPEZ BEAUTY, http://www.jenniferlopezbeauty.com
(last visited Mar, 2, 2015).
33 See Chess Records, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chess_Records (last modified Feb.
19, 5:02 AM); Leonard Chess, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonard_Chess (last modified
Jan. 11, 2015, 7:24 PM).
34 See Stax Records, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stax_Records (last modified Feb.
05, 2015, 6:50 PM).
35 See About Us, GETTY IMAGES, http://press.gettyimages.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2015).
36 Alex Ben Block, Netflix’s Ted Sarandos Explains Original Content Strategy, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Apr. 07, 2012, 11:26 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/netflix-ted-sarandosoriginal-content-309275; Brian Stelter, Netflix’s Strategy: Shows for Every Age, CNN MONEY (Oct. 13,
2014, 3:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/13/media/netflix-kids-interview/.
31
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Software embodied the convergence of technology and content from the
beginning.37 They produce both the creative content of their games as well
as the technology behind them. Likewise, the path-breaking computergenerated image movie company Pixar also engaged in this kind of convergence from its founding.38 Pixar, in fact, has won both content and technology awards.
II.

APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS

Regardless of the actual distinction or overlap among artists, entrepreneurs, creators, and innovators, they all need some means of supporting
both themselves and the practical instantiation of their ideas. This could be
done through grants, awards, prizes, premiums, or other direct support to
the individual. Or it could be done through monetization of the artifacts or
services produced. In capitalist, market-based economies, the latter has
been widely used. But for it to work, the artifacts or services must be appropriable by the producer, otherwise no one will pay money for them. In
other words, if others can simply take or reproduce the artifacts or services
for free, then they will not pay the original producer. Appropriation mechanisms thus allow for producers of artifacts or services to support themselves—and fund future productions—by being able to monetize those artifacts or services.39
The concept of an appropriation mechanism can be illustrated by
thinking about a craftsman who builds furniture. Personal property rights
allow the craftsman to monetize the furniture he produces. For example, a
particular chair he built is his exclusive property, assuming he had lawful
unencumbered rights to the materials used to produce it and did not infringe
anyone else’s rights in doing so. He can then seek to convey title in the
chair to someone else in exchange for money or other value—in other
words, sell the chair. The property right in the chair is the appropriation
mechanism by which he can legally protect his investment and efforts in
building the chair: no one else can simply take the chair without his permission, absent unusual legal circumstances.
37

Valve Software, producer of successful game franchises such as Half-Life, social-entertainment
technology platform Steam, and game-engine developer tool Source, embodies this convergence. Welcome to Valve, VALVE, http://www.valvesoftware.com/company/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
In some ways, this echoes the early decades of the music recording industry in which pioneering producer-engineers developed both content and technology to produce path-breaking multi-track audio
landscapes that were nothing like what anyone had heard before on a regular soundstage. Dan Daley,
The Engineers Who Changed Recording: Fathers of Invention, SOUND ON SOUND (Oct. 2004),
http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/Oct04/articles/rocketscience.htm.
38 Our Story, PIXAR, http://www.pixar.com/about/Our-Story (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
39 See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287, 290 (1986).
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IP rights are then the appropriation mechanisms for products of the intellect.40 They allow one to control not just the artifacts or services one personally produces, but also any copies of those artifacts or services produced
by others.41 The first kinds of IP rights to consider are patents that give exclusive rights to inventors for novel and nonobvious useful products or
methods.42 But this means that the inventor can effectively monetize not
only his own direct production of goods or delivery of services, but also
anyone else’s doing so. At the same time, the inventor and other producers
of the covered goods will have personal property rights over the artifacts
they produce themselves, just based on personal property rights as discussed above. Thus there seem to be two levels of appropriation mechanisms covering the same productions. But the patent mechanism is not so
much aimed at the actual physical goods as it is to the production of the
innovation that the invention represents (and is then embodied in the
goods). The four predominant economic justifications for patents are that
they incentivize development of inventions, public disclosure of inventions
(a condition of patenting), commercialization of inventions, and designing
around currently patented inventions.43
Trade secrets, while less property-like perhaps than patents, are also
appropriation mechanisms that give legal redress to someone with confidential, commercially valuable information or processes whose secrets have
been misappropriated by someone else.44 Secrecy in and of itself can be an
appropriation mechanism. But the law of trade secrets enhances the effectiveness of secrecy as such a mechanism. Secrecy is further enhanced by
the availability of enforceable contracts to allow limited disclosure to select
others without the secret being deemed as now public.45 Additionally, legal
steps taken to control the disclosure of secrets, such as nondisclosure contracts, bolster one’s claim to having enforceable trade secrets.
Copyright is another appropriation mechanism that gives exclusive
rights to authors for copies of their original expressive works, including
technology-oriented goods such as software.46 While the author has to have
fixed the original expression in a tangible medium, once copyright arises
the author can control the production of not only copies she produces, but
also those that anyone else produces. And, again like patents, there are two
levels of appropriation mechanisms at play for any copies. First is the personal property right to that physical object. Second is the copyright that is
40

Id. at 287 & fig. 3.
See id. at 290.
42 See id. at 287.
43 See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 63-68 (6th
ed. 2013).
44 See Teece, supra note 39, at 287.
45 See id. at 290.
46 See id. at 287, 290.
41
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really directed at creation of the form and substance of the work, and not
any particular copies. Further analogous to patents, copyrights are usually
justified as incentivizing the creation of new, original works, the publication of such works (rather than keeping them private), and the distribution
of copies of the work.47
Trademarks are the last type of IP rights that can also be a valuable
appropriation mechanism. In this case, the appropriated object is the brand
of products or services as represented in particular words or images.48 Development of brands has become a core component to the commercialization of creative or innovative artifacts and methods.49 Trademarks are thus
complementary to, and in some cases can be used as a partial substitute for,
patents or copyrights. If consumers are inclined to buy products or services
only from one company due to brand reputation and loyalty, then it may not
matter so much if other companies can freely copy the original company’s
products or services.
Beyond the formal categories of IP rights lie some other legal tools
that can be used as appropriation mechanisms. Rights of publicity under
state law can allow for appropriation of one’s image and other indicia of
personality as a kind of brand of the individual person.50 This is especially
relevant for the monetization of goods or services that are provided directly
by that person, or under their express endorsement or authorization. Likewise, Section 43 of the federal Lanham Act provides rights to any claims of
endorsement or affiliation by individuals or legal persons, such as corporations.51
All of these appropriation mechanisms arose to allow producers of
creativity, innovation, goods, or services to monetize their productions. But
because the revenues will not flow in until after the thing is produced and
deployed, producers need to find some initial way to support themselves
and the development necessary to engage in the commercialization process.
No one would pay to support this engagement unless it was either clearly a
charitable program, or unless there would eventually be a return on what is
effectively an investment. Holding aside the charitable angle, then, it should
be clear that no one would invest without some appropriation mechanism
that would provide them with a favorable return on their investment
through the monetization of the commercialized goods or services. If they
cannot see a way to get such a return, they will not make the investment.
While the linking of investment and appropriation mechanisms should
be painfully self-evident, it can get lost in contemporary IP debates. This is
47 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
437 (6th ed. 2012).
48 Id. at 763-68.
49 See id. at 766-68.
50 Id. at 1064-65.
51 Id. at 943-52.
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because researchers tend to only look at one mechanism at a time. When
they then find an activity that does not rely on that mechanism, they are
tempted to conclude that no appropriation mechanisms are needed.52 But
this of course does not follow. For example, researchers looking at the fashion industry and the stand-up comedy business argue that there is plenty of
innovation in those fields even though copyright is not available for them.53
But this ignores the powerful use of brands and trademarks in fashion, and
glosses over the challenges and violence in the comedian business.54
Thus, again, there have to be appropriation mechanisms for investors
to get a return on their investment. Just because a field does not rely on the
one mechanism someone might expect it to does not mean it uses none of
the other mechanisms. The real question, then, is which mechanisms are
being used in which fields? The next Part explores this core issue, with emphasis on the paradox that all producers want their inputs to be freely accessible, while their outputs should be appropriable.
III. INPUTS AND OUTPUTS
All creators and innovators have both “inputs” and “outputs” with regard to their products or services. In my experience as a transactional IP
lawyer, I classify things like raw materials, processed materials, IP, other
kinds of information, and even funding, as inputs. Naturally, each creator or
innovator would like their inputs to be “free” in both senses of that term:
“free” as in no cost, and “free” as in no permission or authorization required.55 At the same time, one would expect that most creators and innovators would not like their outputs to be free simultaneously in both senses.
For example, even those who might be happy to distribute their works at no
cost generally want a right of attribution as well as the right to prevent uses
of the work that they feel jeopardize its integrity.56 Given that in many cases
52

See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 7-8 (2012).
53 Id.
54 See Dotan Oliar & Cristopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 179091 (2008); David M. Adler, Fashion Law: Protecting Brands and Designs, LANDSLIDE, Jan./Feb. 2013,
at 21, 21-23 (2013).
55 The open source and free software community traditionally illustrated this as the distinction
between “free beer” and “free speech.” What Is Free Software?, GNU OPERATING SYS.,
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2014).
56 Integrity has multiple senses as well. One sense is where others modify the work in ways that
the author or inventor feels changes the meaning or renders it less effective in its practical use, yet still
presents it as the author’s or inventor’s work, respectively. Another sense is context including the appearance of affiliation or endorsement, such as where others use the author’s work as part of a political
campaign for a candidate diametrically opposed to the author’s own political views. There may be less

984

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 22:4

one creator’s or innovator’s output is another’s input, tensions arise as to
how appropriation mechanisms can be used by creators and innovators to
potentially control or affect “downstream” creativity or innovation.
Traditionally, this tension has been viewed in an upstream/downstream
construct within either the “creative” fields or the “innovation” fields.57 In
other words, artists’ use of other artists’ works or inventors’ use of other
inventors’ inventions. But this Essay posits that the real issue is the use of
creators’ works as a kind of commodity or throughput product of innovators’ new search58 and social media platforms. As part of the process, users
of the search or social media platforms may use or modify the original creators’ works, but such use or modification is not being done by the search or
social media platforms. Because the platforms largely monetize their technology innovations through advertising models, they would, not surprisingly, like content creators to exercise minimal appropriation rights so that
maximal content is freely available (in both senses of the word “free”)
through the platforms.59 Content creators, by contrast, of course would generally like some level of appropriability of their works—if for nothing else
other than to ensure proper attribution.60
This Part proceeds by first examining the background of the “remix”
user-generated-content (“UGC”) culture in appropriation art and music
sampling. It then briefly discusses how the UGC culture emerged in its present form through social media platforms. Next, this Part considers the re-

of an interest in this sense for inventors with regard to their inventions (although they likely have these
interests with regard to their persona).
57 See, e.g., Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 2-3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465590##;
Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the
Courts 2, 6-10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 20269, 2014), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20269.pdf.
58 “Search” is used here in its information technology meaning as digital Internet search engines
such as Google. See JACQUES BUGHIN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES: SEARCH 1
(2011); SEARCH ENGINE HIST., http://www.searchenginehistory.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
59 See, e.g., BUGHIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 22-27; JEANETTE CARLSSON, AN ASSESSMENT OF
SOCIAL MEDIA BUSINESS MODELS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION 28
(2010), available at http://www.opengardensblog.futuretext.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/JeanetteCarlsson-An-Assessment-of-Social-Media-Models.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
OECD INTERNET ECONOMY OUTLOOK 2012, at 184-87 (2012); Eric Fulwiler, As Pinterest Meets With
Marketers, Evolving Business Model Gets Clearer: Pinterest Isn’t About Social, It’s About the Visual
Web and Search, ADVERTISING AGE (May 24, 2013), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/pinterestsocial-search/241683/. Some social media platforms have attempted to bring at least users into ad revenue sharing programs, although even these still do not address the third party creators whose works may
be used by the platforms’ users as inputs into the latter’s user-generated content. See, e.g., Mike
O’Brien, Are Paid Platforms the Future of Social?, CLICKZ (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.
clickz.com/clickz/news/2377732/are-paid-platforms-the-future-of-social.
60 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985-87 (2002).

2015]

CREATORS, INNOVATORS & APPROPRIATION

985

lated but different dynamics of search and the access-to-knowledge
(“A2K”) movement. Finally, it presents a core theme of this Essay that at
least some major search and social media firms are trying to undermine
creator attribution mechanisms while downplaying their support for and
enforcement of their own attribution mechanisms.
A.

Setting the Stage for the “Remix” Culture: Appropriation Art

The seminal copyright parody fair use case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.61 helped establish Judge Pierre Leval’s concept of “transformative use” into the case law.62 Section 107 in the Copyright Act sets out four
factors courts must consider when deciding whether the copying of a registered work is actionable infringement:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.63

Campbell concerned a fair use defense raised by the rap group 2 Live
Crew for copying the hit song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by Roy Orbison.64
While 2 Live Crew’s version was clearly commercial, as was the original,
and a substantial portion of the original was used by the rap group, the
Court found that 2 Live Crew had “transformed” the original through what
the rap group claimed was an attempt at parody, such that the new work did
not have much of a detrimental effect on the market for the original.65 Accordingly, the group was not liable for infringement.66
Subsequent to this case, the judicial factor of “transformative use” has
expanded far beyond both the category of music copyright and the fair use
parody defense. It is routinely invoked for almost any copyright infringement claim where it is fairly clear that copying has occurred.67 If the alleged
infringer can create any argument that he has transformed the copied elements from either their original form or by placing them into a new context,
61

510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 579, 589, 584; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1110-12 (1990).
63 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
64 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571-72.
65 Id. at 578-85.
66 Id. at 594.
67 See The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13-14, 17-18 (2014) (statement of June M.
Besek, Executive Director of Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, and Lecturer-in-Law,
Columbia Law School).
62
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then he might be judged to have engaged in permissible activity.68 Fair use
is designed to be one of the Copyright Act’s “safety valves” or “built-in
First Amendment accommodations” that balances the exclusive rights of
authors with important public interest speech and A2K values.69 For example, commentators must be able to not only reference works they wish to
critique, but they also should be able to reproduce short segments for illustrative purposes.70 Likewise, classroom instructors must be able to use segments of works they are discussing in class.71
Around the same time as Judge Leval was articulating transformative
use and the Supreme Court was applying it in Campbell, the emerging doctrine was put to the test in copyright litigation over “appropriation art.” In
this art form, artists take the existing work of others as a kind of “found art”
input that they then modify or incorporate into a new work.72 In an early test
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found appropriation
artist Jeff Koons liable for infringement of the plaintiff photographer’s photo “Puppies.”73 Koons conceded that his sculpture “String of Puppies” was a
copy of the photo, but claimed that it was a fair use because it was intended
as parody or commentary.74 The court was not persuaded, and the case
raised the question of whether an artist can simply claim that he intended to
parody or comment on the original work, or whether there has to be some
objective evidence that the audience for the work would perceive it as
such.75
But the Second Circuit appears to have warmed to the idea of appropriation art as a transformative fair use in recent years. In a 2006 decision
also involving Koons’s work, the court found his collage artwork “Niagara”—which included an unauthorized copy of plaintiff photographer’s image of sandal-clad feet from a Gucci ad—to be a “transformative” fair use
that would be unlikely to have an effect on the market for the original
work.76 In its most recent statement on the matter, the Second Circuit held

68

Id. at 13-18.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
70 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
71 Id.
72 See ROBERT ATKINS, ARTSPEAK: A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY IDEAS, MOVEMENTS, AND
BUZZWORDS, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 69-70 (David Fabricant ed., 3d ed. 2013).
73 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992).
74 Id. at 308.
75 Id. at 310. These types of cases can also raise the further question whether the artist truly intended the work to be a parody or commentary on the original at the time of creation or whether such
claims are simply developed later as a defense strategy.
76 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258-59 (2d Cir 2006) (finding the same appropriation artist’s,
(Jeff Koons’s) use of “Silk Sandals” as fair use and not an infringement).
69
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that a work could be transformative even if it were not a parody or commentary on the work.77
Koons is reputedly about to be sued for copyright infringement yet
again.78 But even as he repeatedly seems to play fast and loose with others’
copyrighted works as merely his inputs, he paradoxically is vigorous to
enforce his own copyrights.79 This underscores the hubris of some creative
innovators: their contributions are valuable; everyone else’s not so much.
B.

The Emergence of Social Media Platforms and User-Generated
Content

When inexpensive digital image processing tools became available in
recent years, they fueled the use of social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Pinterest for posting of UGC. This comes
in three categories, as articulated by Professor Daniel Gervais.80 “Userauthored content” consists of content created entirely by users.81 “Userderived content” consists of content that is created by substantially modifying third-party content.82 “User-copied content” consists of third-party content simply reposted by users to their own platforms.83 The most concerning
categories are user-derived and user-copied, as they involve the works of
others. In the analog print world, such uses by amateurs may not have
raised as many copyright issues because dissemination was limited.84 But
the online digital world of social media changed all this, as the works can
now be distributed around the world with the click of a mouse.
77 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit reversed a district
court injunction against appropriation artist Richard Prince for his use of photographer Patrick Cariou’s
published photos. Id. at 712. The district court had found that Prince’s work did not parody or comment
directly on Cariou’s work, and that Cariou lost at least one potential gallery show because of Prince’s
high profile gallery showing of the appropriated works. Id. at 707-08. But the Second Circuit held that
this application of the fair use factors was too narrow and that twenty-five of the thirty unauthorized
uses were fair, remanding to the district court to review the remaining five under the clarified fair use
factors. Id. at 712. The case was settled before the remand was decided. See Brian Boucher, Landmark
Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince Is Settled, ART IN AM. (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-vprince-is-settled/.
78 See Doreen Carvajal, Koons Again Accused of Copyright Infringement, N.Y. TIMES ARTSBEAT
BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/koons-again-accused-ofcopyright-infringement/?_r=1.
79 Id.
80 Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 858-59 (2009).
81 Id. at 858.
82 Id. at 869.
83 Id. at 859.
84 Id. at 870.
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With regard to user-derived and user-copied content, the question is
whether and when postings that include other creators’ content should qualify as transformative use. Nothing about the Internet changes the basic relationship between copyright and free speech as established in the physical
world.85 Thus, case law around things such as appropriation art should still
be used as reliable indicators for the resolution of fair use questions in digital and social media. Here the focus is on “mash-ups,” “remixes,” or even
simply audio or visual content that happens to include someone else’s work
(such as the infamous “dancing baby” video with a baby dancing along to a
Prince song).86 Are these transformative in the sense of fair use, or are they
instead simply derivative works that are intentionally based on, and benefitting from, the copied work and which need to be licensed from the copied
work’s copyright owner?87
This is a difficult question and well beyond the scope of this Essay,
but the answer cannot be that all uses of other’s content are transformative
just because the user is copying the content for his own purposes. For example, adding some video to a recording of one’s favorite song is likely not
transformative, even though it feels like the video helps others understand
how the song affects you. Likewise, the fact that one is not making money
off one’s postings—and not attempting to—is not dispositive for fair use
either. The Internet does change one part of the fair use dynamic: even if
one is truly posting one’s video-enhanced copy of someone else’s song for
one’s circle of friends, unless the video is password protected or otherwise
restricted, it is now available to the world and can significantly diminish the
market for the song. At the same time, the ease with which digital content
can be manipulated allows for unparalleled possibilities for fair use commentary and parody. The difficult zone is the “other” categories of transformative use that are neither commentary nor parody, alluded to by the
Second Circuit.88
85 See Sean M. O’Connor, The Internet Does Not Reset the Copyright-Free Speech Balance,
GEORGE MASON UNIV. SCH. L.: CTR. FOR PROT. INTELL. PROP, Nov. 2013, at 1, 1, available at
http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Internet-Does-Not-Reset-the-Copyright-FreeSpeech-Balance.pdf.
86 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
87 “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012). The preparation of derivative works is one of the express exclusive rights of copyright owners.
Id. § 106. It is a highly valuable right probably best known to the general public through references in
popular media to book authors’ “motion picture rights.” While there is a compulsory license for new
“covers” of musical compositions that have already been released on phonorecords under direct authorization from the copyright owner, this only extends to new audio recordings, and not to audiovisual
recordings (even where the video portion is simply the musicians performing the song). Id. § 115(a)(2).
88 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).
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For some, this situation is not concerning: user-derived content and
user-copied content should be seen as at least transformative fair use, if not
an indictment of the allegedly outdated legal artifact of copyright law.89
Further, those who view the demise of copyright as of no particular concern
believe that creators who have other jobs or ways of making money will
produce adequate creative works.90 In other words, we should not worry
about whether users post their own content or that of others because copyright is an outmoded means of economic regulation in cyberspace: we
should simply allow users to post freely without regard to obtaining permissions from others or compensating other creators for the latter’s work.
A related strand of this thinking is that the new digital tools for production and distribution of content have reduced production costs to effectively zero.91 For example, anyone with a Mac computer and an Internet
connection can use the GarageBand application to record a song and make
it instantly available to the world. Or, even more basic, anyone can use the
built-in camera and microphone on her computer to record herself performing songs that can then be posted to YouTube for worldwide distribution. If
the clips are good enough, or quirky enough, they will go viral and voila:
recording studios, producers, side musicians, managers, record labels, record pressing plants, record sleeve artists/designers, marketers, distributors,
and record stores have been rendered obsolete.
Except that we do not actually seem to want a world with only what
this Essay will call “amateur song selfies”—no matter how cute they might
be on occasion or how often they introduce a new talent. Instead, as shown
in one of the most famous cases of this phenomenon, the singer in question
did not stop once achieving success with his amateur song selfies. Justin
Bieber followed up his YouTube fame by signing with a label and a manager that put him into a professional studio with professional producers, and
recorded highly produced pop music.92
Thus the issue is not whether people will create new songs and other
content without appropriation mechanisms such as copyright, but whether
89 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 272-73 (2008).
90 See id. at 157; RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 52, at 7-8.
91 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305-06 (2002). For a critique of these assumptions, see Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation in Scholarly Publishing 15 (George
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 13-25, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243264.
92 Bieber’s manager Scooter Braun did keep the artist producing YouTube videos made to look
amateur for a while after signing him to “build him up more” with his Internet fan base. But the intent
was never to let Bieber remain on YouTube in this format forever. Rather it was a calculated marketing
move to build a kind of Internet street cred that could then be translated into major revenues for professional recordings and live performances. Jan Hoffman, Justin Bieber Is Living the Dream, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2010, at ST1.
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they can produce them to the degree we (and they) would like. Quality production takes a lot more than a laptop and the free software that comes
loaded on it.93 Even where that equipment could be adequate, it is the training of the person using it in the production of recorded content that makes it
good, not just ideas for the content generally.94 One person can certainly do
it all, but it takes significant experience and talent to perform all those functions.
Professor Rob Merges argues that policymakers should fight against
the demise of IP in this way because they should support a professional
creative class of artists and inventors.95 But he does not satisfactorily explain why this is important. Primarily he seems to root it in human dignity
and valuing artists and inventors as deserving the support of what he seems
to concede is a utilitarian market intervention by IP systems.96 He also
adopts the position that we will get “better” art and inventions if society
supports a creative class, but does not exactly articulate why.97
There is, however, a direct and pragmatic argument for the value of a
full-time creative class: maintaining and being at the top of one’s craft requires daily practice. It is not about tying it to any particular kinds of individuals, expressions, or inventions. Rather, it is about ensuring that those
whose works seem to be appreciated by others can make the best possible
versions of those works. The importance of daily engagement in one’s craft
is well represented by performing artists such as musicians, who refer to the
phenomenon as “chops.” To “keep his chops up,” the musician must constantly practice. When in this state, the musician can execute difficult passages to the very best of his ability. When he has not played for a while, he
can still play well, but he cannot match his best playing and intensity. This
can apply to any craft or skilled activity. Would you rather undergo brain
surgery from the doctor who is currently performing these operations on a
regular basis or one who has not picked up a scalpel in a few years? Enabling a mechanism so that creators and inventors can get paid for engaging
in creation/invention means that they can do it more frequently—without
the distractions of having to make money doing something else—which in
turn increases the chances they will produce their best work. To be clear,
this is not about “high art” versus “low art.” It is about the artist having the
93

The equivalent of this in scholarly publishing has been well documented by Adam Mossoff.
Mossoff, supra note 91, at 15.
94 See, e.g., Tim Chester, 50 of the Greatest Producers Ever, NME, http://www.nme.com/list/50of-the-greatest-producers-ever/262849/article/265277#article (last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Daley, supra
note 37.
95 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at xi-xii (2011). The creative
class concept largely originated with Richard Florida. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE
CLASS: AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE, at ix
(2002).
96 MERGES, supra note 95, at xi-xii.
97 Id. at 2.
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time and tools to perfect whatever kind of creative expression she envisions.
The further challenge to those who support what this Essay will call
the “content wants to be free” approach is that the social media platforms
are themselves monetizing the content through advertising and data mining.98 Thus, it seems inequitable at best for the platforms and their supporters to be advocating a culture of “free” when the platforms are making
money off that content (and the users’ information on top of it through the
sale of the data generated about such users). This angle will be explored
further in Part III.D below.
C.

Search Engines and Access to Knowledge Movement: Content as
Commodity or Commons

A different debate is over the importance of ensuring that those of limited means or in countries with limited infrastructure can have adequate
A2K in the form of online content.99 In this debate, two conflicting moral
claims must be balanced against each other: the right of creators to exert
some control over their creations, and the public interest in not having important knowledge restricted only to the privileged few who can afford it.
Further, the A2K movement champions the view that some areas of
knowledge should be viewed as the common heritage of humanity and accessible to all. Search engines such as Google, through its Google Books
project, ally themselves with the A2K movement—perhaps in part to share
in the progressive moral high ground that A2K seems to occupy.100
But even though both search firms and A2K claim to start from the positions that authors should get paid for their work and that copyright should
be respected, they seem to favor free access as a trump card over such principles. Content is merely the commodity or commons that gets moved
through the technical infrastructure for mass distribution and repurposing—
preferably as freely as possible. While search firms and A2K do not explain
how creators are supposed to support themselves, one gets the sense that
they believe that creators will simply find salaried positions or government
support. However, this really only works on the government support side
(through salaries, grants, contracts, prizes, etc.) because salaries or support
on the private side only push the problem back to the employer. If the em-

98

See O’Brien, supra note 59.
See, e.g., ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE, http://a2knetwork.org/a2k (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
100 See, e.g., Competition that Works: Why Google Books Project Is Good for Consumers and
Competitors: Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books Before the H. Judiciary Comm.
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of David A. Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund).
99
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ployer cannot monetize the works either, then how can it afford to continue
paying creators or inventors?101
Like social media platforms, search firms are now monetizing UGC in
a way that seems inequitable to both users and third-party creators whose
works are copied or co-opted by users’ postings. In some cases, the monetization is tied directly to pirate sites.102 Thus, a search firm’s rhetorical adoption of A2K ethics and moral high ground should be undermined by its relentless—and highly profitable—monetization of its users’ “free” searches.
Search firms are not a charitable venture. Rather, the model of free searches
available to everyone with an Internet connection is instead a business
model that became highly profitable for firms like Google only because
sophisticated data tracking and mining was also developed by the firms to
maximize advertising and marketing revenues. This puts search firms in
effectively the same position as “free” social media platforms that effectively lure users in to reveal a treasure trove of personal preferences and habits
that can be packaged and sold to big businesses (and others) hungry for
such data.103 But, as discussed in Part III.D below, the protection of these
algorithms by search firms and social media firms through multiple modes
of appropriation mechanisms is also central to their business models, as it
gives them a crucial advantage over competitors whose algorithms are not
as effective. If these competitors could simply copy and infringe the algorithms of dominant players such as Google, the search and social media
landscape would likely look much different.
D.

Search and Social Media Shell Game: Undermining Creator
Appropriation Mechanisms While Quietly Protecting and Enforcing
Innovator Appropriation Mechanisms

The business models of Google/YouTube, Facebook, Pinterest, Instagram, and other search firms and social media platforms rely on content as
a mere “commodity” that is sent through the systems by users as fuel for
101

Of course, the more concerning speculation is that search and A2K proponents simply believe
that creators can, or should, get day jobs working in some other industry to support their creative work
(which will then be done perpetually after hours and on weekends).
102 See Chris Castle, Google May Continue Driving Traffic to Pirate Sites After DMCA Notices by
Using Its Google Alerts Product, MUSIC!TECH.!POL’Y (Jan. 7, 2015) https://musictechpolicy.
wordpress.com/2015/01/07/google-may-continue-driving-traffic-to-pirate-sites-after-dmca-notices-byusing-its-google-alerts-product/.
103 Satirical fake news outfit The Onion provides a hilarious, yet deeply disturbing, send-up of the
data mining and profiling activities of both Facebook and Google. See CIA’s Facebook Program Dramatically Cut Agency’s Costs, ONION, http://www.theonion.com/video/cias-facebook-programdramatically-cut-agencys-cos,19753/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); Google Opt Out Feature Lets Users
Protect Privacy by Moving to Remote Village, ONION, http://www.theonion.com/video/google-opt-outfeature-lets-users-protect-privacy,14358/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
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this community of users to engage with the platforms in ever-increasing
amounts.104 Because the business models are largely ad-based and depend
on data mining for revenue, the number one imperative for the platforms is
to maximize the number of users and click-throughs.105 Many of the systems
have also explored “freemium” business models in which a free version of
the system is offered to lure in users, who will hopefully then convert to the
paid subscription version with more features.106 However, the freemium
models can be difficult to deploy.107 The only revenue models that value
content in and of itself are those that allow copyright owners to monetize
the content by adding links to products related to the content, or even to
sites where those accessing the content can download a legal copy.108 But
these models do not produce revenue for the search firm or social media
firm; they only appease some content owners who can make effective use
of them. Thus, the search firm or social media firm must still produce revenues through advertising, data mining, or subscription models. Thus, when
considering all the business and revenue models, none give the search or
social media platform firms any incentive to protect user or third-party
creator content, other than legal compliance.
Yet even compliance with copyright law does not necessarily provide
a strong incentive for search and social media firms to protect user or thirdparty creator content. In fact, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) unintentionally created a disincentive for search engine and
social media platforms to participate vigorously in protecting the rights of
creators.109 Entrepreneurs starting search engine or social media platforms
that will include UGC are generally told two things by attorneys: (1) put
strong terms of service agreements and the “DMCA Page” on the website;110 and (2) do not monitor UGC.111 Once the site is live, its operators
104

See CARLSSON, supra note 59, at 20-24.
Id.
106 Id. at 26.
107 See Vineet Kumar, Making “Freemium” Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2014, available at
https://hbr.org/2014/05/making-freemium-work.
108 YouTube’s Content ID is one such program. See How Content ID Works, GOOGLE
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). However, sites
using this revenue model must be careful that if they wind up monetizing content posted by users that
turns out to be infringing, they may lose their safe harbor for secondary liability for that infringement
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act discussed in the next paragraph. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B)
(2012) (for sites hosting content); id. § 512(d)(2) (for search engines).
109 The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to set the ground rules for copyright law in the emerging
digital era. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
110 The DMCA Page is what lawyers call the mandatory disclosure under the DMCA of the website’s registered agent for purposes of receiving and acting on takedown notices sent by copyright owners regarding infringing content on the site. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). Such agents must also be registered
with the Copyright Office. Id. Complying with these items enables the website to come under the
DMCA’s safe harbor for “online service providers.”
111 The exception is for offensive or obscene material (unless of course that is the point of the site).
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must remove or block content flagged as infringing if a “takedown notice”
is submitted to the site’s registered agent.112 But this is reactive, not proactive, on the part of the website. Complying with the DMCA notice and
takedown provisions provides the website, as an “online service provider”
(“OSP”) under the statute, with safe harbor protection from secondary liability for the infringing content.113
Those who know the details of the statute may find the “do not monitor” piece of advice curious. There is nothing in the law that prevents a
UGC-hosting social media platform OSP from monitoring content for copyright infringement. But there is no benefit for the social media platform to
do so: it gets the safe harbor regardless. At the same time, there are some
serious potential downsides. First, there are the costs in resources. But even
worse, given the “red flag” provisions under the statute, a social media platform that does monitor may well find itself with actual knowledge of infringement or an awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent.114 At that point, the platform must expeditiously remove
or disable access to the relevant infringing material, or else lose the safe
harbor.115 It must also do so without having received a takedown notice.116
Thus, the advice is “don’t monitor.”
The analysis and advice for search OSPs is similar. However, search
platforms that merely provide links or references to other websites via information location tools are not required to have a registered agent.117 But
the safe harbor is still dependent on them expeditiously responding to
takedown notices (in this case to take down or disable links to the infringing content hosted on the linked site) and removing or disabling access to
any links for which it has actual knowledge, or from the facts and circumstances should be aware, of infringing materials at the linked site.118 There
is no upside to monitoring, and only downsides. So the DMCA makes it
more advantageous to not monitor and simply wait for takedown notices.
At the same time, search firms and social media platforms that want to
do the right thing fear the “chump” factor. If everyone else is playing fast
and loose with copyright—and making money or getting attention for doing
so—why should they walk the straight and narrow path (losing “eyeballs”
and money along the way)? Further, in an environment glamorizing “pira-
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17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
Id. § 512(g).
114 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a OSP will not be held liable for infringement if the OSP
“does not have actual knowledge that material . . . is infringing”).
115 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
116 See id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
117 See id. § 512(d).
118 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
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cy” and adhering to the “culture of free,”119 the copyright-compliant website
might look decidedly uncool.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of many search firms and social media platforms is that they appear to value their own contributions—the
computer code and business model—over the vast amounts of other people’s content that effectively power use of their systems. Taking on the
mantle of “innovation,” they seem to view their new distribution platforms
as more important than the very thing the platforms are ostensibly supposed
to promote: creative expression. If this were merely a superiority attitude it
would not matter much. But a pernicious side effect is that many search
firms and social media platforms seem quite willing to denigrate, or at least
be deeply ambivalent towards, the validity of copyright enforcement for
copyright owners whose materials are arguably infringed on the sites. This
makes sense as it is in their interest. Too much enforcement of copyright—
regardless of whether it is legitimate—might mean less use of the site,
which in turn means lower revenues.
This goes to the central theme of this Essay: some innovators are economically benefitting from their own IP-protected services by monetizing
these services through a model that undermines creators’ IP. In other words,
when Google, for example, uses its advanced algorithms to profit from advertising and data mining tied to links to pirate sites or copyright-infringing
content on its subsidiary, YouTube, it is very much relying on its patents,
trade secret, copyright, and contract protections on these algorithms so that
other search and social media firms cannot simply duplicate this code. A
world in which innovators’ code was seriously threatened by misappropriation and piracy would likely see search firms and social media firms publicly calling for stronger enforcement of their chosen appropriation mechanisms. For example, it is telling that Google has not chosen to make its core
search and analytics code open source, despite its stated “long-term interests in open source.”120 In fact, the company clearly states its proprietary
intentions and use of multiple appropriation mechanisms (e.g., IP, confidentiality, and contracts) to advance its business model in its formal filings
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.121 Underscoring its
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See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Grappling with the “Culture of Free” in Napster’s Aftermath, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/technology/grappling-with-the-culture-offree-in-napsters-aftermath.html. This is in many ways an updated version of the “information wants to
be free” ethic.
120 See Google Inc., Annual Report 13 (Form 10-K), SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 12,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000128877614000020/goog2013123110k.htm [hereinafter Google Inc.].
121 Id.
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commitment to a proprietary model, Google is now number eight on the list
of firms securing the most U.S. patents.122
Thus, it is relatively easy for tech “innovator” firms to undermine the
copyright that protects creators’ content because tech firms by and large use
different appropriation mechanisms. Their code and business models are
often protected by a combination of patents, trade secrets, and contracts (in
the form of the enforceable terms of service that restrict what users can do
with the site, its content, and any accessible code behind it, as well as confidentiality and IP assignment agreements with employees and independent
contractors).123 And while copyright is also usually part of that mix, it is
only one part and the subject matter is computer code—not images, music,
text, or video. Thus, in a kind of shell game, the tech firms can freely advocate for copyright reform that would weaken copyright enforcement for
content owners without much risk that any changes would hurt their own
appropriation mechanisms. In other words, even if their copyright reform
efforts resulted in weaker copyright protection for their own code, they
would still have patents, trade secrets, and contractual restrictions. But content creators really only have copyright to protect their works.
However, the apparent marginalization of content as mere commodity
or commons by tech innovator firms could just as easily be turned around in
theory by content producers: applications (“apps”) are the mere “widgets”
that allow distribution of premium content. Even during parts of the digital
era so far, “content is king.” It could become so again. In fact, given the
proliferation of app developers and resultant apps, they could become a
“dime a dozen” and be even more abundant than UGC. Further, despite the
rise of reality television and other relatively cheap, unscripted shows, that
trend seems to have peaked and receded in the face of a “second golden
age” of television being produced by premium cable channels, broadcast
television, and distribution-platforms-turned-content-producers such as
Netflix.124
CONCLUSION
Tech innovators currently appear to have the upper hand in protecting
their appropriation mechanisms and leveraging business models that undermine the appropriation mechanisms of creators. But this was not always
122

See Don Clark, IBM Wins Most Patents—Again—but Google and Apple Climb in Rankings,
WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Jan. 12, 2015. 9:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/12/ibm-wins-mostpatents-again-but-google-apple-climb-in-rankings/.
123 See, e.g., Google Inc., supra note 120, at 13.
124 See, e.g., David Carr, Barely Keeping Up in TV’s New Golden Age, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2014,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/media/fenced-in-by-televisionsexcess-of-excellence.html.
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the case, and may not remain the situation for very long. In any event, the
“creators vs. innovators” construct is an increasingly skewed and inaccurate
picture of the digital realm. Instead, returning to where this Essay started,
innovators are creators and creators are innovators. Pixar, Getty Images,
Valve Software, and many other “convergence” industry firms create new
technology and content. Netflix and YouTube now produce both distribution platforms and content.
Despite the apparent interest of some deep-pocketed concerns to force
the false innovator-creator dichotomy to advance their own interests (i.e.,
limiting their costs of doing business by running roughshod over content
copyrights), the dichotomy is just that—false—and deeply corrosive to the
kind of constructive dialogue over IP rights and other appropriation mechanisms that are necessary in our digital age society. Further, the insinuated
geography of it—Northern California tech titans versus Southern California
entertainment behemoths—is also inaccurate and unnecessarily divisive.
The rhetoric on the tech side seems to also paint this as a battle of the future
versus the past, with tech on the right side of history, and the entertainment
companies playing the role of hidebound naysayers holding back progress.
But this again is simply false, as illustrated by the technology-pioneering
status of not only entertainment firms such as Pixar, but also content producers such as James Cameron and George Lucas. Meanwhile, the Valley is
not always on the pioneering side, as entrepreneurs and venture capital
firms can sometimes get caught up in chasing “me too” start-ups, mining
some trend that has already peaked.
It all comes back to inputs, outputs, and appropriation mechanisms.
All creative innovators are relying on inputs to develop their value-added
outputs. While this relationship might be more visible in the expressive
arts—because both the artistic inputs and outputs are generally presented to
the public—it is no less true in behind-the-scenes technology advances.
Innovative code and business models rarely rise ex nihilo. Instead they are
built off existing code and business models. Code is built on code. Even if a
developer writes a program completely from the ground up, he will certainly be relying on other code he has read or written. If nothing else, the developer had to learn to code somewhere, and the programs one learned on
are almost certain to influence one’s coding going forward—even when one
is essentially trying to reject that old code to write something completely
different and better to achieve a particular functionality.
Thus, the apparent stance of large search and social media platform
companies to undermine and marginalize copyright for content is not defensible. Under the guise of a kind of open source ethic for content—usually
under the banner of free speech and expression—these firms are simply
trying to keep their input costs as low as possible while glossing over the
fact that they vigorously control, protect, and monetize their outputs. Ultimately, this is a dangerous game: the same arguments they use to devalue
content (“information wants to be free”) can be used against their own pro-
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prietary positions. The key sleight of hand is that firms like Google seek to
deflect attention from their own powerful proprietary technology appropriations by minimizing their reliance on visible appropriation mechanisms,
such as patents and copyright. This allows them to attack those forms of
appropriation mechanisms (on which many of their competitors and input
source providers rely) as regressive controls on A2K efforts, while safely
keeping tight control of their own proprietary creative innovation through
the alternate appropriation mechanisms of trade secrets and contract. At the
same time, Google and other search and social media firms are increasingly
turning to patents and copyright for market appropriation of their innovations. Further, as even Google’s subsidiary of YouTube moves to create its
own original content programming, the message will hopefully hit home
that the appropriation mechanisms of both “innovators” and “creators” need
to be respected as the artificial boundary between them more clearly breaks
down in the digital ecosystem.
Things may get worse before they get better, however. In a disturbing
twist on the anti-copyright/creator rhetoric, some academics and an attorney
at Google recently suggested that society would be better off if we took the
IP rights, or even the life savings, from successful older artists so that they
would have to go back on tour to earn money from live performances and
produce new content. In part, this was based on Professor Glynn Lunney’s
intriguing and provocative empirical research that seeks to show how reductions in record sales as a result of file sharing content piracy have led to
more new hits from existing artists.125 But, even if this is in fact true now, it
is difficult to see how artists will continue to chase increasingly marginal
returns by writing and recording new songs. At some point, the futility of
this will set in and they will be forced to focus on other music or non-music
revenue sources.
Informally, a Google attorney adopted this perspective when he suggested on a widely subscribed listserv that it was “a huge net social welfare
gain” when musician Leonard Cohen had to start touring again to replace
the money embezzled from him by his manager.126 But Cohen is eighty
years old and he was already seventy when he first discovered the prob125

Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Empirical Copyright: A Case Study of File Sharing and Music Output 1-3
(Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 14-2, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372630. Lunney’s paper has been heavily
critiqued for its methods and conclusions. See George S. Ford, What Is the Effect of File Sharing on the
Creation of New Music? A Critical Review of “A Case Study of File Sharing and Music Output,”
PHOENIX CTR. PERSP., Mar. 6, 2014, at 1, 1.
126 “[M]illions of fans were thrilled” and “Mr. Cohen’s revenues have been revitalized” through
new touring revenues and the resultant live albums. This and the subsequent e-mail exchange occurred
on the IP Profs listserv. Because of the semi-closed nature of that listserv, I am not disclosing the names
of the parties here. The full exchange is on file with the editors of the George Mason Law Review,
however. Further, to be clear, the attorney was not speaking on behalf of Google and was a member of
the listserv in his capacity as a law school instructor.
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lem.127 He had amassed a reasonable fortune for producing decades of critically acclaimed music and writings, which have influenced and inspired
countless artists and individuals.128 Despite winning a lawsuit against the
manager, he has not been able to collect any of the damages.129 Interestingly, the attorney is a fan of Cohen and exhorted listserv members to go see
this “global treasure.”130 This seems like a very odd way to show appreciation for respected elderly artists who have worked hard for decades and
look forward to a reasonably secure retirement like any other successful
individual. Along these lines, the attorney was queried as to whether society
should expect the same of successful tech entrepreneurs—many of whom
attempt to retire in their thirties or forties after only one or two “hits.”
Among the start-up community, in my experience, there is indeed a sentiment that not enough great entrepreneurs continue building companies after
finding success. There was no response to this proposal.131
We can discuss the merits and ethics of capitalist systems in which
some can amass substantial fortunes that allow them to retire early, while
others must work for low pay until they are old, exhausted, and unable to
work anymore. That is a legitimate political and philosophical debate. But,
without some compelling differentiator, we cannot call for the taking away
of some persons’ fortunes and not others. The pattern between tech founders and artists is similar in this regard. The best in both fields passionately
believe that they are changing the world for the better and are incentivized
to give up everything else to pursue this vision both because it is the right
thing to do and because they have reasonable expectations that they could
become financially comfortable. Some individuals in both fields have decided to retreat from their activities once they are financially secure. This
ability to retire early—provided one has a big enough “hit”—may in fact
incentivize some to work harder, gamble everything, and perhaps pursue
even more audacious goals than one would if there was little chance of that
127 See Dan Glaister, Cohen Stays Calm as $5M Pension Disappears, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2005,
07:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/08/usa.topstories3.
128 For example, Cohen’s song “Hallelujah” has been covered by over one-hundred artists in many
languages, including versions by Bob Dylan, John Cale, and Jeff Buckley. Leonard Cohen, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonard_Cohen (last updated Feb. 14, 2015); Book Excerpt: Leonard
Cohen’s “Hallelujah” in “The Holy or the Broken,” ROLLING STONE (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/exclusive-book-excerpt-leonard-cohen-writes-hallelujah-inthe-holy-or-the-broken-20121203.
129 See Glaister, supra note 127.
130 “But, most importantly, if you have not seen him perform these past few years, you must, no
matter the ticket price. The man is a global treasure.” See source cited supra note 126.
131 The Google attorney’s comment was actually prompted by another post suggesting that indie
artist Jeff Magnum had recently gotten more active in music again because the money from an earlier
successful album had largely run out. The commenter was, again, a fan of the artist, and considered it
perhaps bad that the fortunes that successful artists have been able to make allow them to retreat from
the public and become recluses: “which situation is closer to copyright’s goals: the wealthy recluse, or
the dragooned (though apparently happy) performer?” See source cited supra note 126.
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“big hit.” But we cannot know this at the moment. At the same time, we can
know that it is generally unfair to change the rules on someone after she has
done her part. Further, it is reasonable to expect that individuals who live in
societies where it is clear that there are no safeguards to property and contracts—where a government can indeed simply swoop in at any time and
take property or ignore/disrupt relied-upon legal relationships—will not be
tremendously inclined to work hard at building up businesses or undertaking activities that rely on property or contract rights.
This is the fundamental point about the need for appropriation mechanisms across both “innovative” and “creative” fields: without them, few
would be able to realize or implement their visions with any degree of certainty that they would then get economic or attribution rights. Some might
be willing to invest their own, and others’, time and resources to implement
a vision just to give it away to all anonymously. But few could afford this,
and it is clearly unsustainable except in non-capitalist societies. The only
bedrock requirements to allow entrepreneurship, innovation, and creativity
to take root are basic rule-of-law tenets like property, contracts, and reasonably steady and predictable systems of adjudication and enforcement. IP
rights may well help these fields truly flourish, and we may generate IPtype rights just from the basic notions of property, contracts, and privacy.132
But without some kind of appropriation mechanisms we will not have sustained innovation or creativity across various fields or genres that are professionally implemented and fully realized.

132 For example, because individuals could keep their ideas, inventions, and creations secret, or
limited to a small number of contractually bound individuals, we can easily take the next step and create, by statute or case law, legal systems for allowing innovators and creators to fully implement their
visions, and make them widely available to the public, on terms set in advance for all, or negotiated in
each case. Arguably this is exactly what formal patent and copyright systems do.

